Too Large and Too Different?

The project of European Integration is challenged by the pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the skyrocketing inflation rates and the policy response of the ECB, as well as by the strong reduction of economic growth rates. Mostly, however, the project Is challenged by its own rules and procedures, as well as by the entrepreneurial attitude of the current Commission and its president Ursula von der Leyen. It is well-established knowledge that it is easier to agree on policies within a small group compared to a large group. The experience of the European Council confirms this insight. In case decisions have to be made unanimously, it needs only one member to block policy initiatives. And yet, it is not only the number that counts. In the case of the EU, it is the political sentiment and ideological undercurrent of member states, present and future, that makes joint policies so difficult. Reflecting the preferences of voters, the Council today is filled with governments of very different political philosophies. Whoever thought that after Brexit, policy decisions would be easier to make is in the wrong.

Given that the European Council only reflects the political conjunction within its member states, it is no surprise that political ideologies regularly clash and that some member states exploit the situation. Often, this leads to either second-best policies or to stalemates that make the EU a weak political actor. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is a most recent example of self-created troubles. As soon as the low-hanging fruits of economic sanctions were agreed upon and the next joint measures were tabled, the weak governance of the Council became obvious. An institution that requires unanimity for critical policy proposals has difficulties in generating quick and decisive action, more so when the distributional effects of policies vary greatly. Member states depending strongly on the import of Russian fossil fuels, were reluctant or even opposed boycotts of Russian oil and gas. In order to come up with a joint front, opt-outs and special treatment clauses are granted. More so, long-festering conflicts about the rule of law practices and the undermining of civil rights were put aside. Poland, for example, became a strong driver for a determined position towards Russia, and out of a sudden, the burdened relations between Commission and Poland turned into a close partnership where the issue of violating the rule of law moved to the backseat. The Polish government was quick to use its improved political position by strategic interventions into unwelcome political programs. Lately, the government has tried to delay and undermine the climate policy initiatives for reaching net zero by 2050. In a very focused piece in the Financial Times, Prime Minister Morawiecki stated that the Emission Trading System needs to be modified in a way that carbon prices go down significantly and the planned extension of covered sectors should get stopped. Hungary, another example, may still not be seen as a darling of the Commission but still gets exemptions and opt-outs that actually strengthen Putin and thus run counter to EU goals. All this despite the last-minute decision of Orban to block the introduction of a 15% minimum tax rate on profits. Not to talk about the ongoing policies toward an authoritarian state. In a recent report commissioned by the Green fraction in the European Parliament, Scheppel/Kelemen, and Mojin (2022) state:“The central finding of this report is that, for ruleof law breaches covered by the Regulation thatare so fundamental, frequent or widespread thatthey represent a complete failure of the budgetaryImplementation and monitoring system in a MemberState, the only measures in response that could beconsidered both appropriate and proportionate,would be suspensions, reductions and interruptionsof 100% of the flow of EU funds. Withholding 100% ofthe funds is warranted because systemic breaches bynecessity put at risk the legality and regularity of allEU expenditure concerned.” What is legally warranted may never turn into actual political action, despite efforts on the side of the Parliament to get tough towards Hungary. Ursula von der Leyen is by far not ready to act, not least due to concerns about further losing internal coherence in a situation where the EU tries to build a common front against Russia. The veto power of governments like Poland and Hungary turns out to be more and more a weak element of EU’s governance. French president Macron stressed this element in the past, and again in regards to the brief discussion about handing candidacy status to Ukraine. Serious negotiations will need a long time but, at the same time, provide an opening for substantial reforms of decision-making processes within the Council. Creating internal coherence within a core group of the Council and simultaneously getting rid of the unanimity rule is one way to make the EU quicker and also more powerful in external affairs. There is a price to pay, though. Dividing up the EU into deepening groups according to policy areas may overcome the coherence problem within groups but not for the EU overall.